We model the internal capital market of a conglomerate where headquarters must rely on information reported by division managers to allocate limited resources across competing projects. Managers may exaggerate project quality to attract more capital, which limits the extent of winner-picking in capital budgeting. Focus (correlated projects) helps headquarters to infer information regarding project quality but makes winner-picking less crucial, whereas diversification (distinct projects) facilitates winner-picking but reduces managers' incentive to report truthfully. We characterize conditions under which diversification improves and destroys firm value, and show that neither allocation efficiency nor firm value varies with the degree of diversification in a uniform way. Capital budgeting and diversification practices are subtle consequences of firms' organization and governance, rather than ex-ante causes of value destruction or creation. Our theory reconciles conflicting empirical findings and offers insights to further testing. * Preliminary draft. We thank seminar participants at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and the 2009 Hong Kong Joint Finance Research Workshop for helpful comments and suggestions.
Corporate diversification is a much debated subject in both academic research and industrial practices. Despite a large amount of research in this area, 1 whether diversification creates or destroys firm value remains highly contested. While the earlier research showed that corporate diversification lowers shareholder value, 2 recent work casts doubts or even refutes this finding. 3 For instance, Campa and Kedia (2002) find that accounting for firms' self-selection and endogeneity bias lowers the diversification discount and sometimes yields a premium. Villalonga (2004) reports that using a U.S. Census Bureau establishment-level dataset produces a robust diversification premium for a sample of firms where using COMPUSTAT segment data yields a diversification discount.
While Fan and Lang (2000) document an integration discount in that vertical relatedness destroys firm value, they point out that this discount depends on the breadth of diversification, and using the same measures, Fan and Goyal (2006) find that vertically-related mergers create value.
Equally controversial is the discussion concerning the cause of such diversification discount (or premium) . Inspired by the empirical evidence that internal capital markets often exhibit "socialism," where capital is allocated equally across divisions despite some divisions having better investment opportunities than others, 4 many theories have been proposed to explain diversification discount in terms of agency conflicts and dysfunctions of internal capital markets. 5 Others attempted to reconcile the discount with firm-value maximization and rational economic outcomes. 6 Nevertheless, besides a vague concept of "synergy," none of these existing theories accounts for the presence and possible sources of diversification premium, especially in relation to the operation of internal capital markets. Thus, linking value implication of diversification to the efficiency of capital budgeting invites more questions such as how empirically observed cross-subsidizations come about affecting firm value, and whether there is a causal relationship between mis-allocation of internal resources and diversification discount. To the best of our knowledge, no consensus has been reached regarding whether diversification creates or destroys firm value, and no theory can reconcile conflicting empirical results regarding diversification and internal capital markets. In this paper, we try to resolve this entangled literature by answering a simple question: When and why is the internal capital market of unrelated diversification more or less efficient than that of related diversification (focus)?
We make a connection between the extent of diversification and the correlation of inter-divisional cash flows. Divisions under a focused firm operate in similar lines of business and engage in projects that tend to succeed or fail together, whereas a more diversified conglomerate spreads its operations in relatively unrelated sectors of industry or even across different industries. Thus, one cannot study corporate diversification without taking into consideration the correlation of inter-divisional cash flows. We thereby model a multi-divisional firm in which two investment projects, each run by a division, generate correlated cash flows privately observed by division managers. Prior to the realization of outcomes, each manager also possesses private information regarding how likely his project, if undertaken, will succeed, which the headquarters must find out before allocating capital to the division. Ideally, headquarters should implement winner-picking by allocating more resources to the division with better investment prospects. However, since division managers may manipulate their reports in conveying information, the headquarters faces a tradeoff between allocating more capital to the more promising division and providing managers incentive to reveal their private information truthfully.
Our model captures two realistic features of conglomerate firms. First, projects tend to have similar chances of success in a focused firm and less so in a diversified one. While most prior studies assume independent realization of outcomes, we explicitly model this correlation across divisions and interpret it as the degree of focus. Second, headquarters may not be able to verify the exact amount of cash flows generated by each division as in DeMarzo and Fishman (2004) , especially in firms with poor governance and auditing practices. This makes inducing truth-telling more difficult because compensation contracts cannot be conditioned on actual realized outcomes. The correlation across projects then enables headquarters to identify project quality more easily, as information can be inferred from other managers' reports in addition to the subject division's own report.
Indeed, it has been shown that when the types of agents are correlated enough, the principal can infer their types as if he had full information. 7 On the other hand, high correlation across divisions renders winner picking less useful as related projects tend to realize similar outcomes. The headquarters must balance the efficiency in capital allocation against the ease of truth gathering in designing the optimal revelation mechanism. We derive the resulting managerial compensation and resource allocation scheme, and produce explicit formulas relating firm value to the degree of diversification. We compare the "no communication" baseline with an alternative setting in which division managers can talk and collude among themselves, and illustrate how internal organization affects resource allocation and firm value. Most importantly, we show that capital budgeting and diversification within multi-divisional firms are not individual, exogenous events. Rather, they are rational responses and outcomes reflecting a firm's organizational structure and internal governance. Moreover, relations between allocation efficiency and firm value to diversification are not monotonic, which explain many seemingly contradictory empirical findings reported in the literature, and produce further, more concrete testable implications.
We illustrate that "socialistic" allocation and diversification do not cause a firm to trade at a discount or premium. The fundamental issue arises from how efficiently the headquarters can implement winner-picking without distorting managers truth-reporting incentives. Indeed, the source of all agency problems in our model comes from the asymmetry of information between the headquarters and division managers. Since final outcomes are not verifiable under our assumption and managers may divert a fraction of projects' cash flow, managers must be compensated in such as way that they no longer have incentive to under-report cash flows and pocket the difference. This implies that managerial compensation must take the form of profit-sharing. Furthermore, since the amount of cash generated when a project succeeds depends on the amount of capital allocated to the project, incentive exists for the manager to exaggerate his project quality in order to attract more resources, as long as his private signal is not a perfect forecast of project's outcome. When internal auditing and regulations are weak, division managers act in their best interests and have more leeway in manipulating reports to the headquarters. The headquarters must then allocate resources more equally across divisions to prevent managers from mis-representing information to 7 See McLean (1985, 1988) , McAfee et al. (1989) , McAfee and Reny (1992) . compete for more capital. As a result, focused operations in undertaking closely correlated projects dominate diversified operations under the circumstances, as the "waste" in allocating resources to a "loser" division is minimized. On the other hand, if division managers are better disciplined so that they are more obligated to report truthfully, the headquarters can then increase the extent of winner-picking in capital budgeting and allocate more resources to the division with more promising projects. Diversification naturally dominates focus in this regime as headquarters can shift most resources away from the "loser" and to the "winner" more efficiently.
Consistent with empirical findings of Scharfstein (1998) and Rajan et al. (2000) , our model produces a link between socialism and diversification discount in firms with weak governance, and that overinvestment in divisions with poor investment opportunities should be more pronounced in more diversified conglomerates. On the "opposite, much unexplored" side, we predict that firms with better managerial disciplines should exhibit winner-picking and diversification premium together, and that overinvestment in poor divisions should diminish. We show that it is common for divisions with relatively better investment prospects to suffer certain extents of underinvestment, as observed empirically. The reason comes from the fact that headquarters must limit the extent of winner-picking in the allocation in order to reduce managers' incentive to over-state their projects' prospects. The model predicts that underinvestment in good divisions should be more pronounced in more diversified conglomerates within the group of firms exhibiting diversification discount, whereas among the group of conglomerates showing diversification premium, this underinvestment problem becomes more severe the more focused the firm's operation. Moreover, as inducing truth-reporting of project qualities becomes even more difficult when division managers may potentially collude, and consequently imposing more stringent limits on the degree of winner-picking, our results imply that firm value must be lower in otherwise similar conglomerates where managers can privately exchange information. Further, this reduction in value should be more pronounced in regions where winner-picking is relatively easy under the no-communication baseline, i.e., in more focused firms with poor governance and in more diversified firms with strong governance.
As described in the first paragraph, existing theories have mainly focused on explaining diver-sification discount without addressing the question as to when and why a diversification premium may be observed in reality. We fill in this gap by providing both a rationale and explicit conditions under which diversification premium can emerge. Our model provides guidelines to future empirical studies to re-examine and reconcile mixed findings reported in this literature. Our paper also complements the theoretical literature in the study of efficiency of internal capital markets. Harris et al. (1982) and Antle and Eppen (1985) are "pioneers" in applying mechanism design approach to study capital budgeting. They model the information asymmetry between headquarters and divisions in the context of transfer pricing. Harris and Raviv (1996) introduce auditing and show that the optimal practice is to set an initial spending limit and provide additional capital upon manager's request. To explain socialism, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Rajan et al. (2000) build models which focus on the role of rent-seeking activities by division managers. Bernardo et al. (2004 Bernardo et al. ( , 2006 show that managerial effort is lower in the strong division which leads the firm to bias its project selection policy against the strong division. All these studies assume independent realization of project outcomes across divisions, and thereby do not generate implications on corporate diversification.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is described in section 1 and the equilibrium is analyzed in section 2. In section 3, we consider an alternative setting in which division managers can collude and compare with the "no communication" outcome. We summarize and discuss major implications of our results in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes. All proofs are given in the appendix.
The Model
The firm consists of headquarters and two divisions. The headquarters acts in the interest of profitmaximizing shareholders. It has access to 2K units of internal capital and two investment projects, each run by a division. For each dollar invested, each project may succeed and generate cash flow H > 0 or fail and generate L = 0 with equal probability. Alternatively, the headquarters can put the money in a risk free project, which yields R f per dollar invested. Let H 2 ≤ R f < H to make things interesting. The amount of capital to invest in each project depends on its quality (type) which is unknown to headquarters. The headquarters may hire division managers who possess private information on the project's quality. Specifically, each manager is endowed with a private signal s i = H or L with equal probability, which indicates project i's better-than-average chance p > 1 2 of generating cash flowṽ i =s i , where i = 1, 2 denotes the first and the second project (division).
Moreover, the types (and outcomes) of projects are correlated such that Pr (s 1 =s 2 ) = r ∈ 1 2 , 1 . Clearly, r = 1 2 indicates independent realizations, and r > 1 2 suggests positive correlation between the two projects. Negative correlation r < 1 2 is not very realistic and has been ruled out. 8 Figure 1 shows the information structure in the internal capital market depicted in our model. Indeed, parameter p characterizes the serial correlation between project quality and future cash flows, and r depicts the cross-sectional correlation between the two projects. We can interpret p as the precision of the manager's private information or managerial valuation ability, and r as the degree of focus in this two-divisional firm. 
is a capital allocation scheme depending on both managers' type announcements, and
is a compensation schedule depending on both managers' type announcements and outcome reports.
Time 1 : Division managers receive private signals (s i ) regarding future prospects of their projects and simultaneously make strategic decisions on their type announcements (ŝ i ).
Time 2 : The headquarters allocates internal resources based on both managers' type announce-
Time 3 : Division managers privately observe project outcomes (v i ) and simultaneously decides whether to divert cash flow or to report truthfully (v i ).
Time 4 : The headquarters keeps the announced cash flows (v 1 +v 2 ), and compensates each manager based on their type and cash flow reports
Since both the type and outcome of projects are hidden information for the headquarters, neither quality is directly contractible. The headquarters can only rely on division managers'
reports. Managers may lie in their type announcements in order to compete for more capital, and misreport final outputs to divert cash flows for their own use. The optimal allocation mechanism should induce managers to honestly report the quality of their investment projects (truth-reporting) and to refrain from diverting cash flows generated (no-stealing). The Revelation Principle enables us to restrict attention to the true message space and impose truth-telling conditions in the analysis.
Of course, we must impose the condition that the headquarters commits to the capital allocation and compensation schemes offered to managers in the beginning.
Division managers suffer a reputation cost c when his type announcement and outcome reports do not agree. If a manager announces a low signal but reports a high outcome, he bears a reputation cost of being incompetent in valuing his project quality. Similarly, if type announcement is high but reported cash flow turns out to be low, the manager is suspected of potential embezzlement.
We also assume one division manager cannot observe the project type and outcome of the other division, and rule out the possibility of communication and collusion between divisions. Indeed, managers should not want to collude as they compete for internal resources. In section 3, we relax this assumption and consider the case in which inter-divisional communication and collusion are possible, and investigate the importance of communication networks within conglomerate firms.
Equilibrium Analysis
An equilibrium of the model contains (1) a mechanism designed by the headquarters specifying a capital allocation rule k * i (ŝ i ,ŝ j ) for the i-th division based on both divisions' type announcements and a compensation schedule w * i (ŝ i ,v i ,ŝ j ,v j ) for the i-th division based on both divisions' type announcements and output reports, and (2) for any allocation rule k i (ŝ i ,ŝ j ) and compensation
, a decision for each division manager (i = 1, 2) on whether to announce his project type truthfully and whether to report final cash flow honestly. The optimal mechanism must induce division managers to reveal their private information truthfully (incentive compatible), and maximize the headquarters' net surplus.
The symmetry between the two divisions simplifies the headquarters' decisions. Its maximization problem is characterized as follows.
subject to: wealth constraint. The incentive-compatibility constraints for truth-telling are summarized in (A) and (B), as we will explain in more details shortly. But first, we present the first-best benchmark in which managers are intrinsically honest by removing the first two truth-telling incentive-compatible constraints.
First-best benchmark: symmetric information
Proposition 1 When managers are perfectly honest and there is no information asymmetry between the headquarters and division managers, the allocation rule is
Division managers receive their reservation wage of 0, and the headquarters makes
Firm value increases with the degree of diversification (decreases in r).
The headquarters implements complete winner picking by shifting all resources to the better division when the two divisions have different future forecasts. The division with low signal does not get any resources, and the two divisions share internal capital equally if they both report promising projects. The firm's overall expected payoff is maximized by the headquarters investing in positive-NPV projects whenever possible, and the risk-free project is undertaken only if both divisions report pessimistic forecasts.
Firm value declines in r, which is the degree of correlation between two projects. In other words, the headquarters wants to diversify as much as possible in order to pick the better project in resource allocation. Any disadvantage of diversification should only arise as we step away from the perfect information framework, as we will discuss next.
Division managers' problem
We use backwards induction to derive the equilibrium under information asymmetry in which managers can manipulate their reports to the headquarters. We focus on division managers' choices first before analyzing the headquarters' optimization problem. Division managers make two decisions.
First, they decide whether to announce project quality truthfully. Second, they choose whether to divert project cash flow for their personal use. The headquarters imposes incentive-compatibility constraints (A) and (B) to induce truth-telling in both cases.
Truthful output reporting
We describe formally each division manager's decision problem. To satisfy the no-stealing condition given each manager's type announcement, we only need to consider the case in which high outcome is obtained. When the project fails, there is no cash to steal and the manager has to report truthfully. When the project succeeds, the total cash flow depends on the capital that has been injected to this project, and the headquarters must compensate the manager well enough to prevent him from appropriation. Thus, constraint (B) must be satisfied, where managerial utility u i (·) is the sum of compensation and possible cash embezzlement less any reputation costs. Specifically, we must haveŝ
for ∀ŝ j and ∀v j . Given the other manager j's (type and output) reports, if manager i honestly reports high outcome, he gets what the contract pays less any possible reputation costs if his type and outcome reports do not agree. If he lies and understates output, he receives the low-state compensation less any possible reputation costs, as well as λ fraction of the total cash flow, in which
(1 − λ) is a cash diversion discount as in DeMarzo and Fishman (2004) . Because the headquarters will not compensate managers more than necessary, the following lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 1
The compensation for each division manager is equity-based and satisfies
It is clear that the headquarters should penalize reported failed project as much as possible. On the other hand, when the project succeeds, the compensation should make the manager indifferent between truthful reporting and lying and diverting cash flows. Since the manager can embezzle λ fraction of the total outputs, the payment scheme must be equity based, with λ as the profitsharing parameter. In addition, the compensation schedule should take into account the manager's reputation cost when his type and output reports are different. Specifically, if the manager reported a low-quality project but obtains high outcome, he will suffer reputation cost c by reporting high output truthfully. The headquarters should remove the manager's reputation concern in this case by providing additional compensation (c) to him. Similarly, if the manager reported a high-quality project and realizes high outcome indeed, he has less incentive to misreport due to the reputation cost associated with lying. The headquarters can thus take away c from his compensation, provided that the remaining payment remains positive. Note that managers cannot receive negative pay, but utility may fall negative due to reputation concerns. The worst case for a manager happens when he announced good project but produces low outputs, under which he gets zero pay and a bad reputation. His utility falls to −c.
One hidden but important assumption is that division managers' information is valuable. Both risky projects are negative net-present-value (NPV hereafter) in absence of any private information, and thus should not be undertaken ex-ante. However, given a high-signal, the project is expected to generate higher net-return than the risk-free technology, raising its NPV to positive and increasing its attractiveness in investment. Therefore, it is critical for the headquarters to learn each manager's true signal in order to make efficient allocation decisions. That is, we impose
Truthful type announcement
We derive the truth-reporting condition for type announcement given the payment function obtained above. The profit-sharing nature of the compensation makes division managers strictly better off if more capital is allocated to their divisions, although they do not exhibit explicit preferences for empire building. This preference for more capital creates an incentive for low-type divisions to overstate their project qualities in order to compete for more resources. In order to induce truth-reporting, the manager must be compensated for honestly announcing a low-type project. Hence, we must have
Note that the no-stealing condition is already in place, and we impose truth-telling given the other party reports truthfully. 9
Similarly, each manager must be motivated to truthfully report a high-quality project, or
To calculate the expectations, we integrate out the other division's possible types and all the possible outcomes given the correlation structure of the model.
Since we do not allow inter-divisional communication, each division manager has no control over the other division's announcement. Given the other manager tells the truth and two projects are of correlated nature, the manager calculates the amount of resources that will be allocated to his division as a result of his type report and determines whether or not to lie. Let us denote
. These parameters can be interpreted as sensitivities of resource allocation in response to changes in one's own type announcement conditional on the other division's report. They are measures of the degree of winner-picking in capital allocation, since they tell us how much incremental resource a division can receive by reporting a good rather than bad project prospect, given the other division's project type.
The following lemma summarizes the truth-telling incentive-compatible resource allocation scheme. Due to the symmetry across two divisions, we drop the divisional subscript hereafter for clarity.
Lemma 2 The incentive-compatible allocation rule which induces division managers to announce their project types truthfully must satisfy
and
Expression (9) corresponds to the truth-reporting condition for a high-type division. It says that the expected marginal increase in capital when a high-type division reports truthfully should exceed c pλH . The term "expected" refers to one's expectation regarding the other manager's report. Given the subject division being high-type, its manager expects the other division also reporting high-type with probability r and otherwise with probability 1 − r. Similarly, expression (10) characterizes the truth-telling condition for a low-type division. Its manager expects the other division reporting low-type with probability r and reporting high-type with probability 1 − r. The expected marginal increase in capital if the manager falsely announces a high-signal given his expectation of the other manager's report should not exceed c (1−p)λH . Simply put, the sensitivity of capital allocation to one's own report should be high enough to make announcing good projects attractive, but low enough to prevent mimicking by low-quality divisions.
Examining the incentive-compatible payment scheme (5) along with the allocation rules depicted above, we can see that division managers face a tradeoff between lying to claim more resources and getting paid at the end. If a good-division manager mis-reports a low signal, it will suffer a certain extent of underinvestment in the promising project. However, when the project succeeds (with better-than-even chances), the manager will get compensated to offset his reputation cost (which arises from the low-type high-outcome reports). If the project fails, the manager receives zero pay but does not suffer any reputation loss. Thus, by overly prudent and understating project quality, the loss a good-division manager suffers comes from the fact that less resources will be invested in a good project and less outputs will be produced. The difference in resource allocation between announcing high and low signals must be large enough to prevent this from happening.
On the other hand, if a bad-division mis-reports a high signal, it will trick the headquarters into overinvestment. Although the project is likely to fail, the manager is protected by limited liability, and the worst case is to get zero pay and bear the reputation cost (which arises from the high-type low-outcome reports). However, the upside potential is huge should the project succeed because lots of resources have been invested. Therefore, the difference in capital allocation between announcing high and low types cannot be too large in order to prevent a bad division from exaggeration.
The typical winner picking theory of Stein (1997) suggests that the headquarters should take internal resources away from divisions with poor investment opportunities and invests them in divisions with better investment opportunities. However, empirical researches have found that headquarters often tend to overinvest in weak line of business and underinvest in strong business divisions. Moreover, capital budgeting does not seem to respond well to changes in investment opportunities. 10 We offer a simple explanation to such empirical anomaly: The need to induce truthreporting from division managers limits the headquarters' ability to shift resources to divisions with better investment prospects. Otherwise, divisions with unpromising projects will falsely announce good prospects in order to compete for more resources. Thus, socialism in capital budgeting can arise as an ex-ante efficient allocation scheme in the presence of information asymmetry along.
The upper bound on the degree of winner-picking without distorting managers' truth-reporting incentive is given in expression (10).
The headquarters must also reward a division with relatively more promising project to some degree to give its manager incentive to report a high signal truthfully. Reporting a high signal is risky in our setup because, unless the manager's private signal is a perfect forecast of project outcome, there is always a chance that a promising project may fail, and should it happen, the manager not only gets zero pay, but also suffers reputation loss. The lower bound on winner-picking is thus determined by expression (9). Note that both bounds are directly proportional to c, which can be interpreted as both punishment for poor valuation abilities and deterrence for lying. We can then think of it as a measure of the strength of managerial regulation or governance within the firm. For a manager of given ability, increasing reputation concerns for conflicting (type and outcome) reports reduces low-type divisions' incentive to lie upwards, but strengthens high-type divisions' incentive to lie downwards.
It is both intuitive and realistic to assume that reputation cost is small enough that managers with promising projects never want to mimic divisions with poor projects. We thereby impose an upper bound on c for the ease of exposition, and focus our attention on the truth-telling of low-type divisions. Specifically, take as a reference the blind allocation strategy in which divisions share internal resources equally. The maximum amount of profits a division manager can steal through lying is pλHK. Let us assume c < pλHK from now on so that (9) holds trivially (which can be verified easily once we derive our results). Thus, only low-type divisions have binding truth-reporting constraints, while high-type divisions enjoy the information rent. 11
As explained above, the bound c (1−p)λH measures the maximum degree of winner picking the headquarters can implement without distorting managers' truth-reporting incentives. Indeed, when the reputation cost is high (c ↑) and managers are skillful in that private information is very precise (p ↑), managers have little incentive to manipulate reports, and a high degree of winner-picking is implementable. On the contrary, if a project is very lucrative (H ↑) and it is easy to divert cash flows (λ ↑), managers' desire for more capital increases, and the incentive to misreport is strengthened. In this case, the headquarters must allocate resources more equally across divisions in order to elicit truth.
Corollary 1
The maximum degree of winner picking by the headquarters is achieved when (10) 11 Relaxing this assumption does not change our results qualitatively.
becomes an equality, in which low-quality divisions become indifferent between reporting truthfully and fraudulently, and high-quality divisions always tell the truth. The degree of winner-picking increases with reputation cost (c) and managerial skill (p), and decreases with the ease of cash diversion (λ) and profitability of the project (H).
We are now ready to solve the headquarters' problem and characterize the equilibrium.
Equilibrium under information asymmetry
We combine the truthful output-reporting compensation (5) derived in Lemma 1 and the truthful type-announcing condition (10) discussed above and solve the headquarters' maximization problem. Note that the first-best outcome derived in section 2.1 can be interpreted as managers having forbiddingly high reputation consequences that they always report information truthfully. To contrast with this, we first present results under the special case where c = 0 before discussing the more general equilibrium under nontrivial reputation costs. 
Managerial compensation is determined according to Lemma 1. Firm value is given by HQ * (c = 0, r <r) = 2R f K, and (12)
When managers suffer no punishment whatsoever for contradicting reports, there is little deterrence for lying and the headquarters completely gives up on winner picking. As we can see, ∆k * (, H) = ∆k * (, L) = 0, implying no change in resource allocation responding to one's own re-port. In this case, whether or not to make an investment depends on the other division's report as well as the degree of correlation between two projects. Given the other division reports a promising prospect, the headquarters allocates capital equally and undertakes both projects if and only if the correlation between two projects is relatively high. Firm value increases in r because high correlation indicates higher chance of two projects co-succeeding, and thus improves the efficiency of this extreme equalized allocation. Otherwise, neither division receives capital and all the resources are kept in the risk-free investment. Firm value therefore does not depend on the degree of focus or diversification.
We discuss this special case before presenting the general result in order to emphasize the role of inter-divisional correlation (focused operation) in headquarters' capital budgeting decisions.
When there are no other effective means to deter mis-reporting, correlation in project realizations helps headquarters to infer true information from managers' reports and make better investment decisions despite a complete socialistic allocation. Otherwise, the headquarters has no choice but to become extremely cautious and conservative, as both projects are negative-NPV in absence of any reliable private signal.
We have characterized two extreme scenarios: one in which truth-telling is automatic under which the headquarters can implement complete winner-picking, and the other where inducing truth is almost impossible and the headquarters must settle with complete socialism and conservatism.
The next proposition describes equilibrium outcomes under intermediate reputation costs.
Proposition 3 Let us denotē
(i) When c < (1 − r)c and r <r, the allocation rule is
The headquarters makes
which increases with the degree of focus r;
(ii) When c < (1 − r)c and r ≥r, the allocation rule becomes
The headquarters' payoff is
(iii) When (1 − r)c ≤ c < (1 + r)c, the allocation rule is
Firm value is given by
which increases with the degree of focus r when c <c, and increases with the degree of diversification otherwise;
(iv) When c ≥ (1 + r)c, the allocation rule becomes k * (LL) = 0, k * (HL) = 2K, and
and firm value increases with the degree of diversification.
In all cases, division managers are compensated according to (5) given in Lemma 1. Figure 2 demonstrates equilibrium outcomes as a function of managerial reputation cost. As
Diversification Discount Diversification Premium
Winner picking increases Winner picking complete with r decreases in r winner picking
More socialistic Increasing winner picking expected, the optimal allocation rule depends on the manager's truth-reporting incentives, which is directly related to the reputation consequences when reported project types and outcomes do not agree. When c is small, so is managers' incentive to reveal information truthfully. As a result, the headquarters can hardly implement winner-picking through one's own report, and instead must place more weights on the other division's announcement as seen from case (i) and (ii) of the proposition. Specifically, if the other division reports a low-quality project, the subject division receives no capital even if its own project is quite promising, i.e., k * (HL) = 0. Given the other division's optimistic report, however, the subject division may receive some resources even if its own project is of low quality, i.e., k * (LH) > 0, provided the two projects are sufficiently correlated.
The headquarters always underinvests in divisions with good prospects, and may overinvest in those with poor forecasts when projects are highly correlated. Good divisions are sacrificed by the presence of bad ones, and bad divisions may be subsidized from the presence of good ones. This extreme form of cross-subsidization is needed to give managers incentive to report project qualities truthfully.
As reputation cost rises and managers are more refrained from manipulating reports, sensitivities of resource allocation to one's own announcement increase, and so is the extent of winnerpicking. As seen from the allocation rule depicted in (18), a division indicating good prospects receives positive allocation, while the division announcing low-quality does not get any capital.
The winner picking theory further predicts that, conditional on a division having very promising project, it should receive more resources if the other division is of low rather than high type. Indeed, our results show that k (HL) > k (HH) if and only if the reputation cost exceeds the cutoff pointc, where managers become more inclined to report honestly. When c becomes sufficiently large as in case (iv) of the proposition, the truth-telling constraint (10) no longer binds, implying that the manager with a poor project no longer want to mimic the manager with good projects and the headquarters can then implement the complete winner picking rule (20). In other words, the headquarters can shift all resources to the "better" division as in the perfect-information scenario without distorting managers' truth-reporting incentives when reputation concerns are large. Of course, cash flow are still unobservable, and the headquarters must use the compensation schedule outlined in Lemma 1 to prevent managers from stealing cash after the allocation stage. Indeed, the first-best firm value given in equation (3) can be obtained by setting λ = 0 and c = 0 in equation
Although proposition 3 lists four distinct allocation rules depending on the value of c and r, we can group them into two regions conceptually: a poor-regulation region in which managers are less refrained from lying (c <c) resulting in a more socialistic allocation, and a strong-regulation region where managers are more disciplined (c ≥c) so winner-picking becomes more evident. High project correlation (focus) improves firm value in the former since the correlation helps headquarters to infer true project prospects, and the more equalized allocation becomes more efficient as related projects realizing similar outcomes. On the other hand, diversification is better in the latter because, as managers have less incentive to lie, the greater extent of winner-picking becomes more useful with the emergence of a better project in a pool of diversified projects. As a result, the degree of winnerpicking measured by ∆k * (, H) and ∆k * (, L) increases in r in the former and decreases in r in the latter. Dividing two regions is a critical reputation costc = (1 − p) λHK, at which point the sign flips.
Corollary 2 The degree of winner-picking in capital budgeting and the value of the firm increase with the degree of focus if and only if c <c, i.e., when the firm has large internal resources (K ↑) and poor regulations against mis-reporting and embezzlement (c ↓, λ ↑), when managers' forecasting skills are low (p ↓), and when projects are very lucrative (H ↑). Otherwise, the degree of winnerpicking and the value of the firm increase with the degree of diversification.
Intuitively, it is harder for the headquarters to implement winner-picking when managers have strong incentives to mis-represent information. Abundant resources, lucrative projects, noisy signals, and poor governance and internal auditing all lead to fraudulent reporting by division managers, and thus reduce headquarter's ability to allocate more resources to the better project. In this weak-governance scenario, however, high correlation across projects actually helps headquarters to process information and distinguish project qualities from examining all divisions' reports. In the strong-regulation regime, on the other hand, the headquarters can rely more on each division's own report, and heterogeneity in project qualities (low correlation) makes winner identification easier.
Therefore, both capital budgeting and the organization of a firm depend on how efficiently the headquarters is able to monitor and regulate managerial behavior. Firms should exhibit either intense focus or intense diversification, depending on the ease of eliciting truth from division managers. Cross-subsidization is not necessarily inefficient ex-ante, and does not cause firms to exhibit diversification discount. Both phenomena arise from the nature of the firm and its investment projects.
Our results produce a number of novel testable implications. First, conditions under which diversification improves or destroys firm value are clearly characterized. Second, we provide a rationale for underinvestment in relatively better divisions and its relation to the degree of corporate diversification. The relationship is not monotonic. Specifically, underinvestment in a better division is more severe the more diversified the firm within the group of conglomerates exhibiting diversification discount, and more pronounced the more focused the firm's operation among groups of conglomerates showing diversification premium. Firms exhibiting diversification premium should show little evidence of overinvestment in divisions with poor investment opportunities. On the contrary, a firm trading at a diversification discount may overinvest severely in bad divisions, especially under poor internal auditing and managerial regulations. The extent of overinvestment should be more pronounced in relatively more diversified conglomerates up to a cutoff pointr.
Further diversification causes firms to cut back in risky investment and instead revert to safer projects.
Besides the degree of focus or diversification within a conglomerate, firm value increases monotonically with managerial skill p, reputation cost c, the return on the risk-free technology R f , the total amount of internal resources K, and project profitability H. Firm value decreases monotonically with the ease of cash diversion parameter λ. In particular, reputation concerns improve firm value in two ways. First, it enhances managers' incentive to reveal private information truthfully, and thus enables headquarters to implement the more efficient winner-picking strategy. Second, it enables the headquarters to reduce managerial compensation when a high-quality project indeed succeeds (s i = v i = H). Of course, when a low-quality project succeeds (s i = L, v i = H), the headquarters must compensate its manager an additional c to even out his reputation loss. However, since private signals predict future cash flows with better-than-even chances, the probability of the latter occurring is rather low, and the firm on average saves money in compensating managers.
Collusion-proof Mechanism
In this section, we present an extension of the model in which we allow communication and potential collusion between division managers. In particular, each manager observes the quality of his own project as well as that of the other division before type announcement, and observes both divisions' cash flows before output reporting. We derive the optimal "collusion-proof" mechanism and compare with the "no-communication" baseline.
Given each manager's type announcementŝ i where i = 1, 2, the truthful output-reporting condition remains unchanged. Division managers have no incentive to collude, as condition (4) ensures truth-reporting given any output report produced by the other division. Thus, the compensation schedule depicted in Lemma 1 remains incentive-compatible.
On the other hand, the truthful type-announcement condition (A) in the optimization problem discussed in section 2 will no longer be sufficient to induce honest reporting. Previously, we make use of a Nash Equilibrium concept in which one division reports truthfully given the other division does so as well. Now we allow communication and collusion between divisions, and each manager should be induced to report truthfully given any type announcement reported by the other division, truth or lie. Thus, the new, stronger incentive-compatible condition for type announcement becomes
Evaluating the expectations for any signal realizations, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 3 The collusion-proof allocation rule which induces division managers to announce their project types truthfully must satisfy
, and
As before, the lower bound ( c λpH ) comes from high types' truth-telling constraint, and the upper bound ( c (1−p)λH ) arises from low types' truth-telling condition. Comparing (23) with (9) and (10), it can be seen that the collusion-proof allocation rule is stronger in the sense that both sensitivity measures must be bounded by c λpH , c (1−p)λH , whereas under no communication or collusion, it is sufficient to merely have weighted-averages (expectations) of these sensitivities bound. As expected, the headquarters has more flexibility in resource allocation when divisions do not talk to each other.
Corollary 3
The maximum degree of winner-picking implementable by the headquarters in the collusion-proof mechanism is bounded by c (1−p)λH , where low-type divisions become indifferent between truth-reporting and lying. Thus, higher managerial skill (p ↑) and higher reputation costs (c ↑) facilitate winner-picking, while more profitable projects (H ↑) and easy cash diversion (λ ↑) inhibit the degree of winner-picking.
The headquarters' maximization problem (1) is solved by replacing constraint (10) with (23).
Proposition 4
The collusion-proof equilibrium in which division managers can privately communicate with each other is characterized as follows.
(i) When c <c and r <r, the allocation rule is
Firm value does not depend on r, increases in H, K, R f , c, p and decreases in λ.
(ii) When c <c and r ≥r, the allocation rule becomes
which increase with the degree of focus r.
(iii) When c ≥c, the allocation rule is
The payoff to the firm becomes
and diversification is irrelevant to firm value. 
Diversification Irrelevant
Figure 3: Collusion-proof capital allocation and diversification effects.
model without communication and collusion, allocation sensitivity increases with reputation cost c, and winner-picking is more evident when managers have less incentive to distort information.
However, recall that in the no-communication baseline, when c is sufficiently large, the headquarters can achieve complete winner picking in which ∆k (, L) = 2K, allocating all resources to the better division. This complete winner-picking can never be achieved under collusion-proof for the range of c we consider, simply because the truth-telling constraint is stronger here. In a collusion-free environment, it is sufficient to require a manager's truth-reporting given his expectation regarding the other manger's report, as seen from (9) and (10). A collusion-proof mechanism, however, must induce truth-telling regardless of what the other division reports, not just in expectation of what it might report. As a result, the incremental resources allocated to a division that reports a good rather than bad signal must be bounded in both ∆k (, H) and ∆k (, L). In fact, neither can exceed K, and underinvestment in a better division is more severe compared to the no-communication baseline.
Another important difference is that headquarters now relies more on one's own report in capital budgeting (k(HL) > 0 always), as division managers observe both projects' qualities and can manipulate reports accordingly. Under low reputation costs where there is little deterrence for lying, two possible situations can arise just like in the baseline model. In more diversified firms where projects are unrelated (r <r), the headquarters relies solely on one's own announcement and completely ignores the other division's report, as if running two separate units. Not surprisingly, firm value does not depend on the degree of inter-divisional correlation. In more focused firms where projects are more correlated (r ≥r), however, both divisions' reports are informative, and we once again observe the cross-subsidization effect in which k (LH) > 0, provided reputation cost is sufficiently low (c <c). As in the no-communication case, focus improves firm value as correlated projects minimize the inefficiency associated with equalized allocation.
When reputation cost is high such that c ≥c, the headquarters can implement winner-picking just like in the baseline model, but to a much lesser extent: A division with good projects gets K units of resources regardless of whether the other division is also good or bad. Diversification again becomes irrelevant to firm value. A diversification premium never arises under this set-up, simply because the degree of winner-picking is so limited. The headquarters can never shift more than half of the resources to a better division in order to prevent poor divisions from mis-reporting.
Overall, capital allocation is less efficient when managers can collude. Stronger truth-telling constraints must be imposed, resulting in more conservative allocation and underinvestment of the "winner" division. This is the price headquarters must pay in return for a more robust truthinducing mechanism.
Proposition 5 The collusion-proof mechanism results in a lower firm value compared to the nocommunication baseline. The difference increases in r when c <c and decreases in r otherwise.
A formal proof is given in the appendix, but the intuition is quite straightforward. The truthful type reporting condition (23) under collusion-proof implies both incentive-compatible constraints (9) and (10) As collusion-proof mechanism further limits the extent of winner-picking across divisions compared to the no-communication case, the relative reduction in firm value should be more pronounced in regimes where winner-picking can be implemented to a greater degree under no communication.
This happens in more diversified conglomerates under good governance (c >c), and in more focused firms with poor governance (c <c).
Our comparison results have interesting implications to the organization of multi-divisional firms. If inter-divisional cooperation is not crucial to the operation of the firm, which is more likely the case under intense diversification, internal tournaments should minimize the collusive incentive of division managers and improve firm value.
Corollary 4 For well-diversified conglomerates under weak governance, the higher the extent of diversification, the larger the value of Chinese Wall between divisions and the higher the benefit of internal tournaments across divisions.
Discussion and Implications
Not only can our results provide a rationale for the prevalent socialistic behavior in internal capital allocation within multi-divisional firms, we also show that diversification could increase or decrease firm value depending on the organizational structure and internal governance of the firm.
In particular, as the degree of information asymmetry between headquarters and division managers increases, inducing managers to truthfully reveal private information becomes more difficult, especially when internal monitoring and managerial regulations are weak. The headquarters is thereby constrained from allocating more resources to divisions which appear to have better investment prospects. Thus, socialism in allocating internal resources can be an ex-ante rational strategy rather than an inefficiency, and increasing focus can improve firm value. Winner picking can be implemented only in the better monitored and regulated firms where managers become hesitant about giving out false information. More diversified projects improve firm value under this regime, since a winner can be easily identified and resources are utilized most efficiently.
Implication 1. More cross-subsidizations in capital allocation should be observed when governance is weak, internal resources are abundant, and projects are more profitable. Winner-picking should be observed otherwise.
Implication 2. Deeper diversification discount should be associated with more socialistic allocation. No discount or even a diversification premium should be associated with winner-picking.
However, the extent of socialism or winner-picking should not have any more explanatory power in firm value after taking out diversification, governance, and other firm-specific factors.
Implication 3. Within the group of firms exhibiting diversification discount, overinvestment in poor divisions and underinvestment in good divisions are more pronounced in more diversified conglomerates. Within those firms showing diversification premium, overinvestment in poor divisions and underinvestment in good divisions are more pronounced in more focused conglomerates.
Over the years, tremendous effort has been spent on improving monitoring strategies and trans-parency of firm operations. We can relate both the value implication of diversification and efficiency in capital budgeting to changes in the degree of information asymmetry between stock-holders and stake-holders, as well as the organization of conglomerate firms.
Implication 4. Firms that receive more media coverage and analyst attention, firms with more transparent operations and knowledgable boards should be more likely to show winner-picking allocations. Diversification should not affect negatively on firm value and can even become beneficial to shareholders.
Implication 5. Firms with abundant internal capital, weak governance, and more profitable projects tend to become more focused. These firms are more likely to acquire companies with related operations and more tempted to get rid of unrelated divisions through divestitures and spin-offs.
To summarize, the most important empirical message we bring is that capital allocation and diversification are not individual, exogenous phenomena, and their implications on firm value cannot be determined through a single regression. Rather, they are jointly determined by many firm characteristics such as amounts of internal resources, managerial skills, project profitability, channels through which information is conveyed to the headquarters, and the efficiency in monitoring and regulating managerial behavior. We must take all these inter-related factors into consideration in order to investigate value implication of diversification and efficiency of allocation schemes within conglomerate firms.
Conclusion
We present a tractable model of multi-divisional firms in which cash flows are correlated across divisions and hidden from the headquarters. We show that the socialistic phenomena empirically observed in internal capital allocation could be a rational response in the presence of information asymmetry and weak governance in order to induce truth-telling from division managers. Focus is preferred as resources are allocated more equally across divisions, and firms should exhibit diversification discount. When the degree of information asymmetry declines, or internal governance strengthens such that truth-reporting is less of a concern for headquarters, winner-picking gets implemented and diversification across divisional operations becomes more desirable.
Our model produces a number of testable implications, which opens up a new door for future empirical research. On the theoretical side, an immediate extension is to endogenize the reputation cost parameter c in a two-period dynamic model. We can further study the realistic case in which communication among division managers helps to improve projects' chances of success, while at the same time creates room for collusion in manipulating reports to the headquarters. The optimal mechanism should induce both cooperation and truth-telling by division managers. In reality, information and communication between headquarters and divisions as well as those across divisions are endogenously determined, in the sense that they influence and are influenced by the structure of internal capital markets. Indeed, corporate vision, organizational structure, communication network, knowledge sharing, and incentive systems are all inter-related and shared by all divisions within a conglomerate. Our paper, by explicitly modeling the correlation in divisional cash flows of a conglomerate firm, is only the first step toward a complete understanding of internal capital markets.
Derivations and proofs Proof of Lemma 1
The non-negativity wage constraint binds at the lowest state in which the manager reports the low-state cash flow of zero. The compensation the manager receives when he declares high-state cash flows follows trivially from equation (4).
Case 2: Both divisions report low signals, unconditional probability
Case 3: One division reports high and the other reports low, unconditional probability (1 − r).
Thus, the firm total expected payoff is given by 
The managers always report output truthfully. No compensation in addition to the reservation wage is needed. Plugging w (·) = 0 and re-arranging, the headquarters' problem becomes
Since (6) implies pH > R f and (1 − p) H < R f , we must maximize k (HH) and k (HL), while minimizing k (LL) and k (LH), subject to the resource constraint (D). Obviously, we must have k (HH) = K, k (HL) = 2K, and k (LH) = k (LL) = 0. Plugging back to the objective function, we obtain HQ F B = (2 − r) pHK + rR f K, which is increasing in r, p, R f , H, K. Notice that this is the same result when we set λ = 0 and c = 0 in equation (21).
Proof of Proposition 2 and 3
Evaluating the expectations in the headquarters' objective function and incorporating the compensation scheme summarized in (5) 
Thus, k (HH) = K when (1 − λ) [pr + (1 − p) (1 − r)] H > R f , and k (HH) = 0 otherwise. We see a complete insensitive allocation regarding one's own report. If project correlation is sufficiently large, headquarters will rely on the other division's report. Otherwise, all resources are kept in the risk free investment. Now consider the general case with nontrivial c. Note that when (6) holds, (1 − λ) pH > R f and (1 − λ) (1 − p) H < subject to the truth-telling and resource constraints. Let k (LL) = 0 without loss of generality. We consider two cases regarding how correlated the two projects are. Case 1: High correlation (focused firm) such that
In this case, two projects tend to succeed or fail together, and the firm should maximize investment when both divisions report high signals, i.e., we can set k (HH) = K. Plugging in the truthful type announcement condition (10) and letting low-types bind 
Since equation (6) implies
we want k (HL) as small as possible. Thus, we must have k (HL) = 0 and k (LH) = K − c (1 − p) (1 − r) λH < K,
provided that reputation cost is not too large:
Notice that k (HL) > K ⇐⇒ c > (1 − p) λHK, and k (HL) ≤ 2K ⇐⇒ c ≤ (1 − p) (1 + r) λHK.
In this regime, the headquarters pays more attention to subject division's own type report and picks the winner. The headquarters makes
Taking the first order condition with respect to r, we obtain
for the low-type, which should be binding. The headquarters' payoff becomes
in which we maximize k (HH). Thus, we must set k (HH) = K, and k (HL) = c (1 − p) rλH − (1 − r) r K > 0, provided c ≥ (1 − p) (1 − r) λHK, which is the same result as in case 1. However, when c < (1 − p) (1 − r) λHK, we must instead have k (HL) = 0, and k (HH) = c (1 − p) (1 − r) λH < K.
In other words, when reputation costs are low so that managers are less restrained from lying, headquarters underinvest when projects are less correlated because it is difficult to infer true information from managers' reports. The headquarters put most capital in the safe investment instead. The payoff becomes
which increases in r. Variations with the other parameters are apparent. This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3
We list all possible realizations of divisions' types and announcements. In order for a low-type division to report truthfully, we must have
Evaluating the expectations, we obtain 
or k (HH) − k (LH) ≤ c (1 − p) λH , and
so the solution depends on the value of pr + (1 − p) (1 − r) as follows. 
The implicit assumption is
